29th MMS at HOMESTEAD AFB, FLORIDA
by Ted A. Morris, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Retired

In the summer of 1965, I was reassigned as Munitions Maintenance Supervisor, 29th MMS, 19th BW (Heavy) at Homestead AFB, Florida.  The 19th BW flew B-52H models.

The 19th BW was the host at Homestead, and the 29th MMS provided storage, maintenance, and loading of MK 28 RI and MK 28 FIFO bombs, W-28 warheads for the AGM-77 missile, and 20mm ammo for the Vulcan Gatling Gun the B-52H carried in the tail. We also provided conventional munitions storage, inspection and maintenance, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) support a lot of EOD support to the many tenants at Homestead.  Air Force tenants included the 31st Tactical Fighter Wings flying F-100s and the 319th FIS flying F-104s.  We also supported the U.S. Army’s 13th and 52nd Air Defense Artillery (ADA) Groups (using both conventional and nuclear armed Nike Hercules missiles), and the 15th ADA which was equipped with HAWK missiles with conventional warheads.  These units were scattered at remote locations throughout South Florida.  We also provided EOD support for numerous aircraft accidents, including F-100s, F-104s and F-105s, and to dispose of assorted munitions confiscated from the numerous Anti-Castro groups that at that time were attempting to re-take Cuba from the communists.

In 1965 the war in Southeast Asia was expanding rapidly and many 462X0s were assigned to support the war, leaving loading teams extremely short handed at all stateside bases.  In the 29th MMS, 462X0, 461X0 and 464X0 manning dropped and remained below 50% for all of my tour at Homestead.  Munitions officers were also in short supply, and for more than eight months, I was the only munitions officer assigned to the squadron.

The complicated procedure to break out, transport, up and download the bombs and warheads, was much the same as at Griffiss.  The 19th BW had eight B-52Hs on Home Station Alert, cocked and ready for an EWO response.  Additionally, we had an Airborne Alert, code named “Chrome Dome.”  Chrome Dome required an EWO loaded B-52 in the air 24 hours a day.  This meant a daily up and download to meet this requirement.  Up and down loads went on around the clock, seven days a week.

Just weeks following my arrival, Hurricane Betsy, which was offshore in the Atlantic, turned around and headed straight for Homestead.  The evacuation order came shortly thereafter, but there was not time to down load the Alert Force aircraft before they had to launch to beat the hurricane’s arrival.  They evacuated carrying their nuclear weapons, which were placed in a “safed” condition, preventing any control or release by the aircrew.  We also sent along loading teams to monitor the status of the weapons and place them in “alert” configuration at their dispersed locations.

Those of us who remained behind sand bagged each of our 21 (*sic) igloos and maintenance facilities to prevent salt water flooding into them and damaging the weapons.  We could do nothing to protect a vast amount of conventional munitions stored in the open between the igloos.  In many cases, these were covered by rising salt water from Biscayne Bay.

The rising water also caused an evacuation by some of nature’s creatures.  In that area lived large blue colored land crabs, with bodies the size of your fist and pincers the size of your hand.  Every one of these crabs crawled out of the swamps to seek higher places.  They climbed up onto the eight foot high cyclone fence surrounding the MSA making a solid wall half a mile long on the seaward side.  I guess they didn’t find the ground high enough, because after Betsy roared through, they promptly died hanging on the fence, and the stink was horrible.  They also were all over Homestead AFB’s single runway and parking apron.  Efforts to clean them up called for troops with shovels and brooms.  The base suffered much damage and required extensive repairs, although was not damaged nearly as much as by Hurricane Andrew 27 years later.

Fortunately, there was no snow removal problem at Homestead, but you could stand there and see the grass grow, especially on the 21 (*sic) igloos.  Many MMS man-hours were expended trying to keep this grass under control.  The CE authorized us to hire local contractors for grass cutting, but you could never get them to come back the second day!  We tried sheep, which were unsuccessful, plus they and the guard dogs were incompatible.  I tried all my time at Homestead to obtain mowing equipment similar to that used by the state highway department to mow along interstate highway interchanges, but was unsuccessful.

One thing I never figured out was how certain situations, which were forbidden by regulation, managed to exist for decades and through dozens of ORITs, until I showed up and got stuck with the problem!  For example, when loading munitions, the aircraft had to be electrically grounded to specifically marked grounding points on the ramp.  These grounding points were not the same as aircraft tie-down points.  As you may have guessed, Homestead did not have any marked grounding points!  In fact, it did not have any grounding points.  It was necessary to temporarily install such points into the earth off the paved parking apron.  No one had detected, much less corrected this deficiency over the many years Homestead had existed.  We never could get CE to install grounding points, and when I departed, we were still using the temporary grounding points.

We also had trouble getting our sister services to cooperate in accordance with the regulation.  At Homestead we provided support the US Army Hawk and Nike Hercules missile units.  One day an inspection team from the Armed Forces Explosives Safety Brand (AFESB) came to visit us in response to a complaint from the Army that a shipment of their Hawk missile motors had been damaged in shipment by rail and/or truck.  It seems that the missile motors were arriving by rail, then transferred to a truck for transportation to an Army assembly building.  The train stopped at a wide spot near the track, and more or less shoved the motors onto the truck.  Several of the motors had fallen onto the ground and been manhandled back up into the truck.  The problem was that this sort of rough handing could cause the solid propellant in the motor to crack, which would in turn cause the motor to explode rather than burn properly during launch.

Although this transfer “procedure” had been going on since the Cuban Missile Crisis, this was the first we had heard of it.  Even so, everyone pointed the finger at MMS for not having properly established the off load site and supervised the train to truck transfer.  We carefully explained to the Army that if they wanted our help, they needed to communicate with us and that since they had set up the operation on their own, it should be their responsibility to monitor it.  After a lot of work, we collectively resolved the issue and convinced the AFESB that the MMS did properly monitor all explosive and munition transportation arriving at HAFB, when we included in the “loop.”

When the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis caused the 3,100 acre base to expand from a single B-52 wing to multi-wing, many aircraft base, there was also a rapid growth in conventional munitions.  Every storage igloo was filled to its limits and much additional munitions were stored outside, exposed to the elements.  Specific storage, inspection and maintenance procedures had been set aside in every conceivable way, all without waiver documentation.

Now in 1965, it was necessary to restore proper procedures to minimize the “explosive hazard” inherent with munitions.  We inspected the munitions stored outside, and found most of it needed to be returned to a depot for reconditioning, and that several tons were too hazardous to be shipped for rework.  They needed to be destroyed before they accidentally exploded, which would have been disastrous in our small, overcrowded MSA.  Disposal of these hazardous explosives was the job of EOD personnel, which at that time consisted of myself and one enlisted 464X0 technician.

The base disposal range had only a one-half pound limit which could not be of any use.  In an extreme emergency, a Dade County landfill 35 miles distant could be used after much coordination with civil officials.  The nearest authorized disposal site suitable for the amount of hazardous material we had was at Avon Park Bombing Range, 200 miles to the northwest, not a satisfactory solution.

Additional Note: I was a 46150 and was assigned to the 31st MMS (formerly the 29th MMS) from 1970 to 1972. Even in that time period, there were still many munitions that had to be destroyed. We used dumping at sea (with the help of the Navy), and at the Avon Park Range. Click here to see official TDY orders ( munitions disposal ) in 1971. (Bruce W. Taylor, USAF 1968-1974)

Failing to get any assistance through SAC or Air Force, I approached the U.S. Coast Guard to help in disposing of these hazardous munitions in an authorized off shore Explosives Disposal site.  The Coast Guard provided a C-123 aircraft and crew for a two week period.  We EOD personnel did all the loading and dumping overboard of the tons of explosives, which solved this very big problem.

In early 1966 the 29th MMS began to receive the maintenance, handling, transporting and loading equipment to support a new weapon for our B-52s, the AGM-69A Short Range Attack Missile (SRAM).  The 2,200 pound SRAM was designed as a standoff missile and could hit targets 100 miles from its launch point.  Eight of these nuclear-armed missiles were carried on a rotary dispenser similar to the cylinder of a “six-shooter” revolver, loaded into aft bomb bay in a special rack.  These were to be carried in addition to the 4 MK 28 weapons “clipped-in” to the forward bomb bay.  As the AGM-77 Hound Dog was phased out, an external dispenser would be adopted to the under wing pylons.  Although I left Homestead before this program was fully implemented, maintaining the missile and warhead were assigned to the MMS rather than AMMS, and our already over-crowded MSA was strained to its limits as we set up for this new munition.

There were even bigger potential problems, and there were code names for them.  These were for events connected with nuclear weapons.  “Broken Arrow” meant an accident involving the weapons had occurred, while “Bent Spear” meant an incident had occurred, and “Dull Sword” meant there was a potential hazard.  These events could be with the weapons themselves, or their delivery vehicles (e.g. an EWO loaded aircraft), towing or loading equipment, check-lists and procedures, or maintenance functions.

There weren’t many Broken Arrows, but we had a good one at Homestead.  During takeoff on a Chrome Dome mission, the pilot aborted the take off after the go/no go decision point, and naturally could not stop the aircraft before running out of runway.  The aircraft came to a stop in the overrun after rolling over several rows of runway approach lights.  Then, the heavily loaded B-52 began to sink into the soft macadam surface.  This effectively put the Alert Force out of action until the runway could be cleared.  Also, by the book, this required the wing to do several things:  First, the BW would need to generate a replacement Chrome Dome loaded aircraft, while, second, it had to maintain the already airborne Chrome Dome with inflight refueling and, third, it had to notify everyone up the chain of command that the 19th BW had a Bent Spear.

Having a Bent Spear was not thought well of by SAC, and the 19th BW “leadership” decided that, since the pilot was in error for aborting and the aircraft could be towed out of the approach lights and launched, albeit late, they need not declare a Bent Spear.  However, they could not move the heavy aircraft with the available equipment.  We in the MMS recommended removing the more than ten tons of nuclear weapons and warheads before proceeding, but that idea was vetoed.  When they finally made the attempt to move the aircraft, they broke a hydraulic line in the wheel well and sprayed fluid onto the hot brakes, which caused a flash fire which was immediately extinguished.  However, by the book, we now had a Broken Arrow, which, combined with the chain of errors leading up to it, was not going to be a career enhancing incident for the wing’s decision makers.

It had now become necessary to, finally, download the weapons.  The B-52 had settled deep into the macadam and it was necessary to let almost all the air from the tires of our MHU-7M weapons trailer before we could clear the bombs from the bomb bay.  The aircraft had to also be defueled before it was light enough to be moved.  All in all, the 19th BW had many major problems that day.  But, help was on the way!

The next day, the SAC no-notice ORIT team arrived and found the 19th BW unsatisfactory and therefore non-combat ready.  So was the 29th MMS.  As a result of the ORIT, the same personnel system which could never locate more than 50% manning for the 29th MMS, located and reassigned to Homestead two senior 4625 munitions officers, three senior 46290 NCOs, and some additional munitions mechanics.  They also gave me orders to Vietnam.  I certainly didn’t feel badly about that, in fact I was so fed up with the 19th BW and the kind of leadership which turned Bent Spears into Broken Arrows, that I was afraid they would cancel my orders!  I departed Homestead in 1966, just a year after my arrival, glad to get away from the most frustrating MMS assignment I was to have.

Additional: While each BW would have a no-notice ORIT at least once every six months from SAC or a SAC Numbered Air Force (2nd, 8th, 15th, or 16th), they also received a practice no-notice ORITs code named “Golden Hour Tango” every six months.  The wing would do everything the same as during a “real” ORIT, and I’m not certain I ever knew the difference.  Each MMS was also evaluated every six months by the respective Numbered Air Force Munitions Standardization Team (MST).  They would not run a full ORIT schedule, but would check the MMS 472X0 Standardization Team and Maintenance Branch 463X0 operations.  Because each MST inspected differently, SAC created a headquarters level Munitions Standardization Evaluation Team (MSET), which also inspected each MMS every six months.  The Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA) also had a separate inspection team, but they only came once a year!  The Nuclear Safety Agency also got into the act with a separate inspection on how well the MMS safety program was operation.  The Armed Forces Explosive Safety Board also checked on our explosive siting, storing, transporting, and handling operations, plus several other areas I’ve forgotten.  We also had Staff Assistance Visits from wing, and it was common practice for one MMS to send personnel TDY to another MMS to provide “staff” assistance!  Throughout my ten years in the SAC MMS business, I had quite a few inspections, evaluations, and “we’re here to help you” visits, and I’m rather proud to say that with the exception of Homestead, any unit that I was in for more than a month passed them all with flying colors.  Now it looked like I would be on the other end of the stick for a while.

However, Air Force intervened and whisked me away from the command in which I had spent 18 years, and assigned me as Director of Training, U.S. Naval School, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Indian Head, Maryland, the same school from which I had graduated four years previously.  I wasn’t exactly devastated.

Believe it or not, I enjoyed most of my years in SAC where I served as Aircraft Performance Engineer (B-36), Navigator/Bombardier (B-47), Weapons Instructor and Munitions Officer.  I served with numerous top notch people, had experiences I will remember for a life time, and really believed I did my part to help win the cold war.

*sic   I was stationed at HAFB from 1970 to 1972 and can remember only 18 igloos. Plus, aerial photographs shows only 18 igloos instead of the 21 mentioned above. Please click HERE to see the aerial photograph of the WSA/MSA. (Bruce Taylor, 46150, 1968-1974)

Main story source above: http://www.zianet.com/tmorris/mms.html

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